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Routledge, 2013), ISBN: 978-0-415-67353-2  
 
Although Foucault can rightly be defined as one of the most important and influen-
tial thinkers of the past 50 years, his ideas have never been immediately accepted 
without some degree of controversy. As a matter of fact, all his major books – from 
Madness and Civilization (1965) to The Will to Knowledge (1979) – have spun bombastic 
debates and his frequent contributions to current social and political events have 
generated wildly different reactions ranging from the enthusiastically positive to the 
irredeemably negative. 
Only the problematic relationship between Foucault’s thought and the legal 
field seemed to elicit a sort of consensus. Authors as diverse as Habermas and Pou-
lantzas, have claimed that Foucault excessively underplayed the role of law in mod-
ern societies in favour of disciplinary or governmental dispositifs, and, most im-
portantly, that he did not pay enough attention to the liberating force of rights 
against the ploys of power. Not surprisingly, for many years, the only monograph 
on the subject published in English1 suggested the so-called “expulsion thesis”. Such 
thesis, in very short terms, holds that Foucault expelled law from the locus of power, 
thus overlooking and distorting the whole modern legal phenomenon to an unac-
ceptable extent.  
More recently, such trenchant criticism has come itself under scrutiny. Ben 
Golder, through several articles2 and a monograph written together with Peter Fitz-
patrick3 has revived the debate, arguing that it is indeed possible and fruitful to ex-
trapolate a theory of law out of Foucault’s scattered remarks, that shows how law 
itself is not to be seen as opposite to and subjugated by disciplinary/governmental 
apparatuses, but that law both legitimizes and limits them, favouring a dynamic 
which leaves always open the possibility for resistance and change.  
                                                          
1Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham, Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance (London: 
Pluto Press, 1994).  
2 Ben Golder, “Foucault's Critical (Yet Ambivalent) Affirmation: Three Figures of Rights”, Social & 
Legal Studies, vol. 20, no. 3 (2011), 283-312; “Foucault and the Unfinished Human of Rights”, Law, Cul-
ture and the Humanities, vol. 6, no. 3 (2010), 354-74; “Foucault and the Incompletion of Law”, Leiden 
Journal of International Law, vol. 21, no. 3 (2008), 747-63. 
3 Ben Golder and Peter Fitzpatrick, Foucault’s Law (Routledge: London, 2013). 
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The collection of articles that form Re-reading Foucault: On Law, Power and 
Rights represents an interesting and stimulating addition to such a revival, attempt-
ing to use Foucault’s toolbox to show that the legal discourse is not just a 
smokescreen for the machinations of an omnipresent power, but to explore in a criti-
cal and engaged way how law establishes its own legitimacy and how it would be 
possible to think about the legal field in different terms. The aim of the book is thus to 
“re-read Foucault in order to draw out the legal implications of his work – either di-
rectly or via some application of his work” (3). 
The book is divided in three parts which – as the title makes evident – address 
respectively the issues of law, power, and rights. Since, in my opinion, there is a the-
oretical continuity between the first and the third parts of the book, while the second 
part represents a sort of parenthesis, I will address preliminary the latter, in order to 
develop a more organic analysis of part one and three subsequently. 
The three articles by George Pavlich, Veronique Voruz, and Pat O’Malley, 
constituting the second part of the book, present a familiar vibe for the Foucauldian 
scholar as they address respectively three well researched Foucauldian concepts: 
sovereignty, surveillance, and biopolitics. While threading a more familiar path than 
the other contributions to this collection, these articles offer valuable insights into 
Foucault’s work.  
Pavlich, focusing upon the governance of the colony of the Cape of Good 
Hope at the turn of the 19th century, follows Foucault’s famous reading of Hobbes’s 
concept of sovereignty to argue that colonial rule is best understood as “an ongoing 
achievement of local power relations that seek to fashion legitimate and effective le-
gal or governmental forms” (109), and thus a model that in turn folded back into the 
governmental home rule of European powers.  
Voruz’s aim is to “map what Foucault says of the gaze at different times” 
(128). Through a rich textual analysis, Voruz demonstrates that the Foucauldian gaze 
is not “about what one sees but rather how one looks” (135). This shows both that 
panopticism is not to be understood as the grid of intelligibility of the present, but as 
an historically contextualized manifestation of a particular regime of visibility; and 
that the gaze is at the centre of Foucault’s inquiry which ultimately aimed at show-
ing “that what and how we see, what and how we look, is the effect of the apparat-
uses within which we see and look” (145).  
In his very intriguing chapter, O’Malley amends or rather supplements Fou-
cault’s insights into neoliberal governance. O’Malley suggests that the roots of ne-
oliberal biopolitical project can be traced as early as Jeremy Bentham’s later works. 
Bentham, in fact, not only proposed the famous Panopticon, but, later in his life, 
linked this idea with a legal model relying heavily on fines and economic transac-
tions, a model not unlike the “law and economics” model spearheaded by the ne-
oliberal Chicago School in the USA in the 1970s. O’Malley thus claims that there is a 
logical continuity between individualising discipline and environmental govern-
mentality, offering an original and organic view on the – largely neglected – rela-
tionship between these two modes of governance (165).   
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As mentioned, the first and third part of the book, both focusing on the legal 
field, are characterized by a common theme: how can we use Foucault’s ideas to cre-
ate a positive critique of the legal field, one that would not only illuminate its op-
pressive side but also open up possibilities for change and liberation?  
The first part of the book is composed of four articles authored, respectively, 
by Colin Gordon, Peter Fitzpatrick, Alan Hunt, and Lissa Lincoln. While Gordon’s 
and Lincoln’s contributions are both stimulating – the first suggesting that the unsat-
isfactory readings of Foucault’s ideas on law on the part of leftist authors boils down 
to the fact that such ideas posed troubling questions that leftist orthodoxy preferred 
to ignore for contingent political reasons; the second suggesting an unexpected (albe-
it superficial one would argue) similarity between Camus’s sceptical humanism and 
Foucault’s genealogical approach to contemporary problems, in so far as both posi-
tions “imply a perpetual calling into question of their own discourses”(96) – it is the 
interaction between Fitzpatrick’s and Hunt’s positions which provides more titillat-
ing food for thought.  
Fitzpatrick, in his contribution, develops further the argument that he and 
Golder put forward in Foucault’s Law,4 namely law’s double nature, at once legitimat-
ing discipline/governmentality and limiting their effect. Fitzpatrick suggest, in this 
regard, that law must be understood as an “exteriority that brings together yet holds 
necessarily apart law of the inside [i.e. law’s internal discourse] and law of the out-
side [i.e. the variegated regimes of power/knowledge that continuously attempt to 
colonize law itself]” (57). As a consequence, while law can represent an instrument 
of oppression, it also represents a powerful instrument of resistance as “it maintains 
inextricably an illimitable openness, a receptive regard to what is ever beyond pow-
er” (58).  
Hunt – incidentally one of the theorists attacked by Gordon in his article – 
seems to chime in to these considerations by recognizing the fruitfulness of Fou-
cault’s vision of juridical forms as part of an assemblage of power. He thus addresses 
the concept of the “juridical” which, he contends, was linked too hastily by Foucault 
to a command theory of law, where legal rules are exclusively prohibitory. Accord-
ing to Hunt the juridical can be more properly defined as designating “those social 
relations and practices that involve the application of rules by means of prescribed 
processes and procedures through which decision making occurs that involves a de-
termination of the rights of the participants and where this invocation of rights 
serves to confer legitimacy on such decision” (78). By amending in such a way Fou-
cault’s concept of the juridical, he claims, we can better identify those heterogeneous 
assemblages – uniting legal norms and disciplinary mechanisms – that constitute the 
variegated constellation of legal practices.    
From these two chapters, which almost support each other, there emerges the 
possibility of an engagement with law that would not be limited to the unfruitful di-
chotomy “law in the books” vs “law in action”, but would rather take into serious 
                                                          
4
 Ben Golder and Peter Fitzpatrick, Foucault’s Law, n. 3. 
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consideration both aspects of law at the same time, as the two sides of the same coin. 
Foucault’s ideas on law become hence a powerful “toolkit” for the legal scholar will-
ing to approach law as a living and changing object, characterized by a heterogene-
ous, multiform, ambiguous and ultimately open-ended relationship with power, 
knowledge and truth.   
The final part of the book seems to take advantage of such insight and at-
tempts to explore law’s openness by addressing a notoriously problematic issue in 
Foucault’s thought. Foucault’s later apparent endorsement of a humanistic ideal re-
lying on the language of rights as a means of resistance, would, in fact, represent a 
sort of U-turn with regards to his previous critical position on rights understood as 
expression of sovereign power. Philippe Chevalier, Paul Patton and Jessica Whyte’s 
articles offer some ways out of this dilemma. Building on the consideration that Fou-
cault’s approach was always context specific, they suggest that Foucault’s cursory 
references to a new kind of rights, “the rights of the governed”, must be understood 
as an original set of “counter-conducts” that aim at undermining contemporary re-
gimes of governance moving from the very same ideological premises that inform 
those regimes.  
In this sense, Patton argues – through a reading of Rawls as an advocate of 
contextualism that parallels Foucault’s commitment to historicism – that we should 
commit to a theory of rights that would focus on their politically contingent – and 
therefore challengeable, mutable and ultimately agonistic – nature. Chevalier scruti-
nizes the inherent difficulty of such manoeuvre by pointing out that the liberal and 
neoliberal discourse on rights, while providing room for dissident practices, has tak-
en a turn towards management-risk style of governance that isolate instances of pro-
test making it more difficult to practice collective forms of resistance (183). Whyte, in 
a similar vein, critically maps out how the potential field of counter-conduct against 
the state represented by NGOs’ international action in the area of human rights, has 
now become colonized by states’ neoliberal interventionism in the name of global 
humanitarianism.  
Such theme, that rights can be strategically deployed both as a means of op-
pression and counter-conduct is further developed in the final chapter by Bal Sokhi-
Bulley. More specifically, she claims that the European Union’s agency devoted to 
the protection of human rights (Fundamental Rights Agency) is ultimately to be seen 
as a governmental dispositif in so far as it contributes to the social construction of cer-
tain ethnic groups or communities as victims, thus making them more manageable 
and “disciplined into self-reflection” (239).  
 These arguments are all valuable and insightful but leave one wondering. 
What is the difference between this kind of approach and the stance of a liberal criti-
cal theorist? If what Foucault had to say about right boils down to the claim that they 
are to be theorized as ungrounded, strategic, and performative,5 would not Foucault 
just provide an internal and localized critique to the modern liberal discourse leav-
                                                          
5 Golder, “Foucault and the Unfinished Human of Rights”, n. 1. 
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ing its framework substantially intact? Would not the force of Foucault’s radical cri-
tique of contemporary nexuses of power/knowledge be almost irredeemably lost? 
This “danger” is clearly visible in Patton’s article. If – so to say – Foucault and a lib-
eral champion like Rawls can be read alongside one another, then Foucault should 
be interpreted as a scholar defending the liberal ideal (which, as an ideal, is a noble 
one indeed), and the ideological discourse of liberalism comes to be elevated to the 
status of a universal master discourse from which it is impossible to escape. This is 
certainly a legitimate possibility. But is it a necessary one? Are there no other ways 
in which Foucault’s could be used to criticize structurally our contemporary legal 
discourse? This remains an open question to which this otherwise interesting and 
thought-provoking book does not provide an answer.  
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